

Poll worker training needs to target these specific problems

Public Comment to the Allegheny County Board of Elections

November 27, 2023

by Juliet Zavon

Three examples illustrate poll worker mistakes that disenfranchise voters. Training can address these.

A voter reported to me what happened at Wilkinsburg 02 01 (the polling place at Community Forge - Johnston School) for the third year in a row.

When the poll worker saw that the voter was a registered Independent, the poll worker said the voter could only vote on ballot issues, not for candidates. The Judge of Elections agreed. The voter corrected her, explaining that this is true in the primaries when there are different ballots for Independents, Democrats, and Republicans, but that it is not true in the general election when everyone uses the same ballot. The poll workers eventually let this voter vote but said they hadn't allowed others to vote.

Training should specifically address this situation. Online training should have test questions on it, and in-person training should also have testing.

Did any of these poll workers take training? While PA does not require training to be a poll worker, what more can the County do to encourage poll workers to get training and test even those who do not? In many states, training is required before each and every election no matter how many times a person has been a poll worker. Laws change, technology changes, and court decisions all change election procedures.

Two additional examples show further gaps in training that should be addressed.

At Pittsburgh 14-14 (Sterrett School) poll workers questioned whether people could vote if addresses on their drivers licenses that didn't match addresses in the poll book. They also considered not allowing people to vote when they thought their signatures didn't match the signatures printed in the poll book.

Many procedures are not intuitive to poll workers (e.g., why do voters sign the poll book if poll workers don't do anything with the signature?) Training that included information so poll workers understand the reason for procedures or changes would help reduce errors. For instance, summarizing court decisions about signature matching would help poll workers make sense of procedures and understand an evolving and contentious issue.

Sincerely,
Brenda Forman
Allegheny County

From: Brenda Forman
Sent: Tuesday, November 14, 2023 11:30 PM
To: Garofolo, Jessica <Jessica.Garofolo@AlleghenyCounty.us>
Cc: Voyer, David <David.Voyer@AlleghenyCounty.US>; Executive <executive@alleghenycounty.us>
Subject: RTK Albert Monitoring Services

Dear RTK Officer:

Did Allegheny County use the Albert Sensor/Albert Monitoring Services when conducting the November 7, 2023 elections?

If so, could you please share the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between CISA (Center for Internet Security), Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and Allegheny County for Cyber Security Services?

Additionally, I would like to see the record of all internet traffic and data from the Albert Sensor occurring between 6AM-Midnight on 11/7/2023, please.

Thank you for your kind consideration.
Brenda Forman

Voye, David

From: Brenda Forman <brendaforman@msn.com>
Sent: Sunday, November 26, 2023 1:29 AM
To: # Board of Elections
Subject: November 27, 2023 BOE Comments 4of 4: Fwd: RTK Albert Monitoring Services

Following is the email that was sent to the Allegheny County Right to Know (RTK) Officer to which I received the following response on 11/22/23.

RE: RTKL Request - #W013663-111523

Dear Brenda Forman:

This is in response to your attached request for records made pursuant to the Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law (RTKL), which this Office received on 11/15/2023.

Please be advised that the County is invoking its right under Section 902 of the RTKL for an extension of time to complete a review of your request and to issue a final response for the following reason:

Section 902 (a) (3) - A timely response to the request for access cannot be accomplished due to bona fide and specified staffing limitations. Limited staff requires the need for additional time.

By law, the Office of Open Records has thirty days to issue a final determination regarding this request. A response is expected to be provided within thirty days of the date of this letter.

Sincerely,
/s/ Jessica Garofolo
County of Allegheny Open Records Officer

Is it possible that someone with the current or future BOE would have the answer to this request to assist with the limited staffing?

Thank you, again, for your attention.

action, you have 90 days to correct these violations and vulnerabilities.
Thank you kindly for your time and consideration.

Signed,

Brenda Forman

September 8, 2023

complete FULL FROG encryptions and decryptions that are BAKED into all AES Encryption used across the world wide web.
Additionally, please refer to the following citizen-made website :<https://novotingmachines.com> for even more tech expert testimonies. At this link, you will see a video showing that no type of voting machine is secure: see ES&S, Dominion, & Hart InterCivic CEOs at the House Administration Committee testimony on Election Security, Jan 9, 2020. Next, I ask you to review the video of Mr. Clinton Curtis, Computer Programmer, testifying under oath at an Ohio senate hearing on December 13, 2004. He designed a program to flip the votes and he states, "the County Boards of Elections would never see it." And finally, please see the third video, which reveals the additional risks of using Wireless Modems and Tabulators: see ES&S, Dominion, & Hart InterCivic at the House Administration Committee testimony on Election Security, Jan 9, 2020. ([Source No Voting Machines – Hand Counted](#))

Paper Ballots Only — Make Your Vote Count

I trust that, in good faith, you will review, digest, and investigate these findings because you have taken an oath of office to serve the public, support the Constitution of The United States and The Constitution of The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the authority of "The People." As American citizens, We the People, all share a civic responsibility to participate in the essential foundation of self-government.... not just by voting, but by engaging in every state of the electoral process to ensure our elections are administered legally and fairly with close scrutiny so that we may have confidence in the results.
The informed American public are making our pleas for an honest, verifiable paper-trail of our votes WITHOUT THE USE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS. We desire the 2024 elections to move forward with sequentially marked, paper ballots with hand counting and hand deliverance of paper totals to central counting and a verifiable chain of custody for all. This will smooth the progress of a legal, fair, and most of all TRANSPARENT election.
Faith in "Free, Fair, and Secure elections" have been forever tarnished and this can't be said lightly, you and those before you were on watch during this critical time in American History. It is necessary for closure and public confidence that an in-depth investigation into election crimes be carried out.
In summary, the problem is vulnerable electronic systems, and the solution is paper ballots, counted by hand with witnesses and on camera. As long as the problem of FROGS & COTS exists, the machinery is useless. These new systems with a so-called paper record of our votes are insufficient to ward off the above- mentioned problems. Please contemplate the weight of this serious matter and promptly advise how you will address it.
You are hereby 'On Notice'; Per, 52 U.S. Code § 20510 - Civil enforcement and private right of

percentage of votes and the change in tallies. Incredibly, the creator of this block cipher attracted the Central Intelligence Agency back in 1998 because it was created to be able to DEFEND "itself" from unknown and unpredictable cyberattacks but also was a failsafe in case AI was ever to get out of hand. In essence, it's the key to Quantum computing. The block cipher has come a long way from the original pitch below. How do I know? I was there in 1999 when the creators pitched it to former top brass namely, John Brennan, James Clapper, General Hayden, General Jones, John McCain and up-and-coming tech giants who use FROGS but unknowingly have the original FROG machine instructions baked into them.

"FROG is very easy to implement (the reference C version has only about 150 lines of code). Much of the code needed to implement FROG is used to generate the secret internal key; the internal cipher itself is a very short piece of code.

It is possible to write an assembly routine of just 22 machine instructions that does full FROG encryptions and decryption. The implementation will run well on 8-bit processors because it uses only byte-level instructions. No bit-specific operations are used. Once the internal key has been computed, the algorithm is fairly fast: a version implemented using 8086 assembler achieves processing speeds of over 2.2 megabytes per second when run on a 200 MHz Pentium PC." Back then it was an algorithm with 8 cycles and a complicated for that time key schedule. Many worked hard as others have to amplify it and most AES block ciphers draw on the FALSE portrayal of what FROG was.

Building out a code is almost like a house that you build out, only ciphers are built out with subkeys upon subkeys but nevertheless the foundation remains the same. A FROG is simply a bidirectional interpreter. There is no master secret key UNLESS you know the ORIGINAL FROG block cipher key. That means EVERY FROG block cipher used is compromised because the master key is baked into its structure which was one of the unspoken and undetectable design flaws.

The text and original architecture has seemed to have vanished from books, papers and databases but a handful of people knew the actual core cipher. Incredibly, FROG was depicted as a weak key class when it wasn't. Its original architecture was not being discussed it was MISREPRESENTED and another faux version of it was "destroyed" so no one would look since the Agency took interest. They wanted the original architecture buried. As far as Dominion lawsuits for defamation....it seems that the FROGS will destroy them all. Dominion sent me a letter asking me to retract my article from 2019. Why? How does that article apply to them? They want me to retract the math I did- and never mentioned their company. WHY? I am a FACT witness. It is because they realized that I EXPOSED the actual inner workings. It exploits their "proprietary" information. Why would I retract the only evidence showing that their "proprietary" software isn't really proprietary if the master key exists? The master key is an algorithm that the Central Intelligence Agency purchased back in 1999 and I had the pleasure of learning it when it was running on 8-bit processors. I don't need a book or paper to remember the most incredible assembly routine that uses only 17 machine instructions that can

Another revealing expert witness is the brave whistleblower, Terpsehore Maras. Ms. Maras has been a private contractor with experience gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence and has acted as a LOCALIZER during the deployment of projects and operations both OCONUS and CONUS.

She is a trained Crypto-linguist, holds a completed degree in Molecular and Cellular Physiology and has FORMAL training in other sciences such as Computational Linguistics, Game Theory, Algorithmic Aspects of Machine Learning, and Predictive Analytics, among others. I highly recommend that you interview her and obtain an official copy of her certified Affidavit of Truth. Please see her affidavit: Declaration of Terpsehore P

Maras <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.wied.92717/gov.uscourts.wied.92717.9.13.pdf>

Per Ms. Maras, much of the fraud within election systems can be carried out through tech vulnerabilities such as FROGS and COTS – components off the shelf. Pennsylvania needs stronger state laws to truly guarantee certain COTS and hidden nefarious programs are not allowed in our systems and that we have transparent inspections by an appropriately trained, accredited entity. It should not be acceptable that the manufacturers of our voting systems do not allow their “proprietary” codes or components to be fully inspected.

Here, Ms. Maras explains what FROGS are, but I would also refer you to her affidavit containing in-depth knowledge of COTS.

FROGS are potentially the downfall of ANY tech company’s security not just

Dominion. Dominion systems have a “cipher trapdoor.” Its where code exists to translate plain text (info that you are transmitting to a receiver – like ballot votes to receiver for tally) into

encrypted code and then encrypted code back into plain text. It’s a FROG

ciphertext. Ciphertext is basically encryption of plaintext (just naked data). Block ciphers use

logical operators or “exclusive OR” (XOR) logic operators that are fixed sequences applied to plaintext and a secret key to yield ciphertext. FROG block ciphers are stealthy. They actually

HIDE the actual fixed sequences or primitive operations even when the cipher is

known. Normally the key is used as data, but a FROG uses the secret key as data and ALSO as a set of guidelines and instruction to create, combine or ALTER the data. That means the secret

key (cipher key) is used as a program – therefore FROG INTERPRETS the data as the KEY

INSTRUCTS. For example. Your ballot goes into the machine. The trapdoor “shuffles and

cleanses” according to Dominion to anonymize your votes and spits them out on the other side

“anonymized” to supposedly match your original data but without looking like the original data so you [are] awarded privacy. You just have to trust them since you aren’t allowed to know

their secret key. Is this why the EAC appointed companies and [now] states AREN’T allowed to

examine the “proprietary code”?

They claim their software is proprietary because it’s about encryption – when in fact there is a

FROG baked into it. Your ballot goes in as plaintext, a secret key encrypts it and then the same

key decrypts it and then it comes out as plaintext again, so they say. FROG Ciphers use

SECRET KEYS that are programs allowing to implement scripts and algorithms. Hence the

with Pennsylvania’s compliance with HAVA via the acceptance of federal HAVA funds for PA Elections_

2018 HAVA Election Security Grant

cos.pa.gov

as well as voluntary compliance with the EAC machine testing requirements. Below is a segment from the Judge’s order where he cites the commissioner’s admissions, after

State_Requirements_for_Certification09042020

PDF Document • 562 KB

which the judge goes on to validate the plaintiff’s ‘actual controversy’ and thereby establishes merits.

Notice of Vulnerabilities: Brave whistleblowers and technical specialists have gone on the record to enlighten us about how election fraud IS possible and has been happening right under our noses. The attached affidavits are legal-binding declarations made under oath or affirmation. I will focus here on two of these expert specialists. One is J. Alex Halderman, the other is Terpeshore Maras.

Mr. Halderman has a PhD in Computer Science from Princeton University and is Director of the Center for Computer Security & Society. He is also an esteemed Professor of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Michigan. Senior Judge Amy Mil Totenberg of the Northern District of Georgia had been placed Mr. Halderman’s expert witness report on voting machine vulnerabilities under seal. Isn’t it interesting that Judge Totenberg, in the swing state of Georgia, doesn’t want the public to have access to this crucial information? It is still redacted, even so, Mr. Halderman’s important report can be legally found in the public domain as it was newly released in June 2023. Please read the “Declaration of J. Alex Halderman: <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23846675-halderman-report%C2%A0%20%C2%A0>

In the Halderman Declaration, he states, “In my report—a 25,000-word document that is the product of twelve weeks of intensive testing of the Dominion equipment provided by Fulton County—I find that Georgia’s BMDs contains multiple severe security flaws. Attackers could exploit these flaws to install malicious software, either with temporary physical access (such as that of voters in the polling place) or remotely from election management systems. I explain in detail how such malware, once installed, could alter voters’ votes while subverting all the procedural protections practiced by the State, including acceptance testing, hash validation, logic and accuracy testing, external firmware validation, and risk-limiting audits (RLAs). Finally, I describe working proof-of-concept malware that I am prepared to demonstrate in court.”

Voye, David

From: Brenda Forman <brendaforman@msn.com>
Sent: Sunday, November 26, 2023 1:01 AM
To: # Board of Elections
Subject: November 27, 2023 BOE Comments 2 of 4: Violations and Vulnerabilities

The following was sent (with several edits) to Pennsylvania Secretary of State Schmidt regarding the Violations and Vulnerabilities of election machines used in Allegheny County. Please read, and heed. Per PA Election code (please see email 1 of 1), we can decide to NOT USE ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES, especially since they have so many vulnerabilities. Thank you for your attention.

52 U.S. Code § 20510 - Civil enforcement and private right of action

B) Private Right of Action

(1) A person who is aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may provide written notice of the violation to the chief election official of the State involved.

Re: Official Notice of VIOLATIONS and VULNERABILITIES

Dear Secretary Schmidt, in your official capacity as the Pennsylvania Secretary of State:

This letter is to:

- notify you of election machine violations and vulnerabilities.
 - share fellow American's affidavits with facts that affirm vulnerabilities.
 - plea for the use of paper ballots only / request that no electronic voting systems be used at all.
- For years many hard-working Americans have become aware of illegal use of voting machines, voting irregularities, loopholes, and weaknesses that exist in our electoral processes that may leave room for fraud, and provide "We the People" a cause for action.

Public awareness on this topic has heightened and now your constituency demands more from you than to allow the status quo to continue. Christopher Krebs, the disgraced former DHS Director of CISA was fired for falsely stating that the November 3rd, 2020 Election was the most secure in American History. An ever-growing mountain of forensic evidence has since justified his termination. Have you reviewed the evidence? Have you answered the citizens who have requested evidence of Free, Fair and Secure elections?

Notice of Violations: 'Actual Controversy' has been established regarding the lack of certification of election machines. The Election Commissioner of Delaware's legal representation has acknowledged, and the judge has recognized (on July 19, 2023), that the election voting machines are not certified per federal certification by the EAC or NASED. See R..... v. Albence, Kent Superior Court K22M-07-010 NEP. This of course is in clear violation of 'The Help America Vote Act' (HAVA) of 2002, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, along

and meets all such requirements, such system shall be deemed approved and may be adopted for use at elections, as herein provided. With respect to any electronic voting system approved for use in this Commonwealth by the secretary, the report of the secretary shall specify the capacity of the components of that system, the number of voters who may reasonably be accommodated by the voting devices and automatic tabulating equipment which comprise such system and the number of clerks and machine inspectors, if any, required based on the number of registered electors in any election district in which the voting system is to be used, such specifications being based upon the secretary's examination of the system. Any county which thereafter may adopt any such approved system shall provide the components of such system in a number no less than that sufficient to accommodate the voters of that county or municipality in accordance with the minimum capacity standards so prescribed by the secretary. The county board shall comply with the requirements for the use of the electronic voting system as set forth in the report by the Secretary of the Commonwealth. ((b) amended Dec. 9, 2002, P.L.1246, No.150)

(c) No electronic voting system not so approved shall be used at any election, and if, upon the reexamination of any such system previously approved, it shall appear that the system so reexamined can no longer be used safely by voters at elections as provided in this act or does not meet the requirements hereinafter set forth, the approval of that system shall forthwith be revoked by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and that system shall not thereafter be used or purchased for use in this Commonwealth.

(d) When an electronic voting system has been so approved, no improvement or change that does not impair its accuracy, efficiency or capacity or its compliance with the requirements hereinafter set forth, shall render necessary the reexamination or reapproval of such system.

Thank you for your time.

Brenda Forman
Qualified, Registered Elector
Allegheny County

and, as soon thereafter as practicable, shall provide for the installation of such system in the remainder of the election districts of the county or municipality.

(e) Any county or municipality may, by a majority vote of its qualified registered electors cast at any general or municipal election held not earlier than one hundred and three weeks after they have voted to adopt an electronic voting system, direct the discontinuance of the use of such a system at all elections held in such county or municipality. Upon the receipt by the county board of elections of a petition signed by qualified registered electors of the county or municipality equal in number to at least ten (10) per centum of the total number of electors who voted in said county or municipality at the last preceding general or municipal election, the question for the discontinuance of the use of such an electronic voting system shall be submitted to the qualified registered electors of that county or municipality, subject to the same requirements as to the conduct of the election as is required for the submission of the question on the authorization of the use of an electronic voting system. The question as to the discontinuance of the use of an electronic voting system shall be submitted in the following form: "Shall the use of an electronic voting system be continued in the (county or municipality) of"?"

(1104-A added July 11, 1980, P.L.600, No.128)

Section 1105-A. Examination and Approval of Electronic Voting Systems by the Secretary of the Commonwealth.--(a) Any person or corporation owning, manufacturing or selling, or being interested in the manufacture or sale of, any electronic voting system, may request the Secretary of the Commonwealth to examine such system if the voting system has been examined and approved by a federally recognized independent testing authority and if it meets any voting system performance and test standards established by the Federal Government. The costs of the examination shall be paid by the person requesting the examination in an amount set by the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Any ten or more persons, being qualified registered electors of this Commonwealth, may, at any time, request the Secretary of the Commonwealth to reexamine any electronic voting system theretofore examined and approved by him. Before any reexamination, the person, persons, or corporation, requesting such reexamination, shall pay to the Treasurer of the Commonwealth a reexamination fee of four hundred fifty dollars (\$450). The Secretary of the Commonwealth may, at any time, in his discretion, reexamine any such system therefore examined and approved by him. The Secretary of the Commonwealth may issue directives or instructions for implementation of electronic voting procedures and for the operation of electronic voting systems. ((a) amended Dec. 9, 2002, P.L.1246, No.150)

(b) Upon receipt of a request for examination or reexamination of an electronic voting system as herein provided for or in the event he determines to reexamine any such system, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall examine the electronic voting system and shall make and file in his office his report, attested by his signature and the seal of his office, stating whether, in his opinion, the system so examined can be safely used by voters at elections as provided in this act and meets all of the requirements hereinafter set forth. If his report states that the system can be so used

Secretary of the Commonwealth, and the board shall thereafter notify the Secretary of the Commonwealth, in writing, that they have done so.

(b) The installation throughout the county or municipality of the electronic voting system adopted by the county board of elections may be accomplished either simultaneously in all election districts or in stages at the discretion of the county board, and the manner of implementation as among election districts shall also be at the discretion of the county board: Provided, however, That the electronic voting system adopted by the county board shall be fully implemented throughout the county or municipality within one hundred and three weeks after the approval of the adoption of an electronic voting system by the electors of the county or municipality. Upon the installation of an electronic voting system in any election district, the use therein of paper ballots and of voting machines shall be discontinued, except as otherwise provided herein.

(c) If the question hereinbefore provided shall have been submitted to the qualified registered electors of the county or municipality and the majority of the electors voting thereon shall have voted favorably thereon, and if the county board of elections shall not, within one year after such vote, have executed a contract or contracts providing for the purchase, lease or other procurement of an electronic voting system for use at the general, municipal, primary or special election occurring at least one year and sixty days after such vote, then the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall forthwith in writing, notify the said county board of elections that, after the expiration of thirty days, he, under the authority of this act, will award, make and execute such contract or contracts on behalf of the said county, unless the said county board of elections shall make and execute the same prior to the expiration of that period and shall notify him, in writing, that they have done so.

(d) If, upon the expiration of said thirty days, the county board of elections still shall not have made and executed a contract or contracts providing for the purchase, lease or other procurement of an electronic voting system as aforesaid, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, on behalf of the said county and upon the approval of the Attorney General as to form, shall thereupon award, make and execute a contract or contracts for the purchase, lease or other procurement of an electronic voting system, approved as required by this act, for each election district within such county or municipality, and the cost of such system, including the preparation and printing of specifications and all other necessary expenses incidental thereto, shall be the debt of the said county, and upon the certificate of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, it shall be the duty of the controller, if any, to allow, and of the treasurer of the county to pay, the sum out of any appropriation available therefore or out of the first unappropriated moneys that come into the treasury of the county. If the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall find it impracticable to procure an electronic voting system for installation in each election district of the county or municipality for use at the election then next ensuing, he shall provide for the installation of such a system in as many election districts of the county or municipality as shall be practicable

municipality, at any primary or election, the question "Shall an electronic voting system be used at polling places in the (county or municipality) of?"

(b) The county election board, upon receipt of a request from the governing body of a municipality, said request being evidenced by the filing of a copy of a resolution certified by the secretary or clerk of the municipality, or upon the filing of a petition with them signed by qualified registered electors of the county or municipality, equal in number to at least ten (10) per centum of the total number of electors who voted in said county or municipality, at the preceding general or municipal election, but in no case less than fifty, shall, at the next primary or election, occurring at least sixty days thereafter, submit to the qualified registered electors of such county or municipality, the question "Shall an electronic voting system be used at polling places in the (county or municipality) of?"

(c) The county board shall cause the said question to be submitted at the primary or election, in accordance with the provisions of this act relating to elections.

(d) The election on said question shall be held at the places, during the hours, and under the regulations, provided by law for holding primaries and elections, and shall be conducted by the election officers provided by law to conduct such elections. The election officers shall count the votes cast at the elections on said question, and shall make return thereof to the county election board of the county, as required by law. Said returns shall be computed by the county election board, or other return board, and, when so computed, a certificate of the total number of electors voting "Yes" and of the total number of electors voting "No" on such question shall be filed in the office of the county election board, and copies thereof, certified by the county election board, shall forthwith be furnished to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and to the county commissioners or other appropriating authority of the county or municipality.

(e) If a majority of the electors of any county or municipality, voting on such question, shall vote against the adoption of an electronic voting system the question may again be submitted to the voters of such county or municipality. ((e) amended Dec. 9, 2002, P.L.1246, No.150)

(f) Whenever, under the provisions of this act, the question of the adoption of an electronic voting system is to be submitted to the electors of any county, the county board of elections shall purchase, lease or otherwise procure those parts of the system used by the voter in a quantity sufficient for reasonable demonstration of the system or systems in such county prior to the general or municipal election in question.

(1103-A added July 11, 1980, P.L.600, No.128)

Section 1104-A. Installation of Electronic Voting Systems.--(a) If a majority of the qualified registered electors voting on the question in any county or municipality vote in favor of the adoption of an electronic voting system, the county board of elections of that county shall purchase, lease, or otherwise procure for each election district of such county or municipality, the components of an electronic voting system of a kind approved, as hereinafter provided, by the

Voye, David

From: Brenda Forman <brendaforman@msn.com>
Sent: Sunday, November 26, 2023 12:13 AM
To: # Board of Elections
Subject: November 27, 2023 BOE Comments 1 of 4: PA Election Code

Warning! This email was sent from an external source. Please be sure you recognize the sender and use caution when clicking on links and/or opening attachments.

Please find the section of the PA Election code that makes mention of electronic voting systems. It states that the use of electronic voting systems are to voted on by a majority of qualified registered electors. Has this occurred?

(1101-A added July 11, 1980, P.L.600, No.128)

Section 1102-A. Authorization of Electronic Voting Systems for Use at Polling Places.--Any county or municipality may, by a majority vote of its qualified registered electors voting thereon cast at any primary or election, authorize and direct the use of an electronic voting system for registering or recording and computing the vote at all elections and primaries held at polling places in such county or municipality.

1937 Act 320

ARTICLE XI-A

Electronic Voting Systems

(Art. added July 11, 1980, P.L.600, No.128)

(1101-A added July 11, 1980, P.L.600, No.128)

Section 1102-A. Authorization of Electronic Voting Systems for Use at Polling Places.--Any county or municipality may, by a majority vote of its qualified registered electors voting thereon cast at any primary or election, authorize and direct the use of an electronic voting system for registering or recording and computing the vote at all elections and primaries held at polling places in such county or municipality.

(1102-A added July 11, 1980, P.L.600, No.128)


Section 1103-A. Placing the Question on the Ballot; Election Thereon.--(a) The county election board may, upon their own motion, submit to the qualified registered electors of the county or

Declaration of Terpsehore P Maras

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, Terpsehore P Maras, make the following declaration.

1. I am over the age of 21 years and I am under no legal disability, which would prevent me from giving this declaration.
2. I have been a private contractor with experience gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence and acted as a LOCALIZER during the deployment of projects and operations both OCONUS and CONUS. I am a trained Cryptolinguist, hold a completed degree in Molecular and Cellular Physiology and have FORMAL training in other sciences such as Computational Linguistics, Game Theory, Algorithmic Aspects of Machine Learning, Predictive Analytics among others.
3. I have operational experience in sources and methods of implementing operations during elections both CONUS and OCONUS
4. I am an amateur network tracer and cryptographer and have over two decades of mathematical modeling and pattern analysis.
5. In my position from 1999-2014 I was responsible for delegating implementation via other contractors sub-contracting with US or 9 EYES agencies identifying connectivity, networking and subcontractors that would manage the micro operations.
6. My information is my personal knowledge and ability to detect relationships between the companies and validate that with the cryptographic knowledge I know and attest to as well as evidence of these relationships.
7. In addition, I am WELL versed due to my assignments during my time as a private contractor of how elections OCONUS (for countries I have had an assignment at) and CONUS (well versed in HAVA ACT) and more.
8. On or about October 2017 I had reached out to the US Senate Majority Leader with an affidavit claiming that our elections in 2017 may be null and void due to lack of EAC certifications. In fact Sen. Wyden sent a letter to Jack Cobb on 31 OCT 2017 advising discreetly pointing out the importance of being CERTIFIED EAC had issued a certificate to

Pro V & V and that expired on Feb 24, 2017. No other certification has been located.



9. Section 231(b) of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 (42 U.S.C. §15371(b)) requires that the EAC provide for the accreditation and revocation of accreditation of independent, non-federal laboratories qualified to test voting systems to Federal standards. Generally, the EAC considers for accreditation those laboratories evaluated and recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) pursuant to HAVA Section 231(b)(1). However, consistent with HAVA Section 231(b)(2)(B), the Commission may also vote to accredit laboratories outside of those recommended by NIST upon publication of an explanation of the reason for any such accreditation.

United States Department of Commerce
National Institute of Standards and Technology



Certificate of Accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025:2017

NVLAP LAB CODE: 200978-0

Pro V&V
Huntsville, AL

*is accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for specific services,
listed on the Scope of Accreditation, for:*

Voting System Testing

*This laboratory is accredited in accordance with the recognized International Standard ISO/IEC 17025:2017.
This accreditation demonstrates technical competence for a defined scope and the operation of a laboratory quality
management system (refer to joint ISO-ILAC-IAF Communique dated January 2009).*

2020-03-26 through 2021-03-31

Effective Dates



For the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program

10.

11. VSTL's are VERY important because equipment vulnerabilities allow for deployment of algorithms and scripts to intercept, alter and adjust voting tallies.

12. There are only TWO accredited VSTLs (VOTING SYSTEM TEST LABORATORIES). In order to meet its statutory requirements under HAVA §15371(b), the EAC has developed the EAC's Voting System Test Laboratory Accreditation Program. The procedural requirements of the program are established in the proposed information collection, the EAC Voting System Test Laboratory Accreditation Program Manual. Although participation in the program is voluntary, adherence to the program's procedural requirements is mandatory for participants. The procedural requirements of this Manual will supersede any prior laboratory accreditation requirements issued by the EAC. This manual shall be read in conjunction with the EAC's Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual (OMB 3265-0019).



- State Participation:** Requires Testing by an Independent Testing Authority. MI requires that voting systems are certified by an independent testing authority accredited by NASED and the board of state canvassers.
- Applicable Statute(s):** “An electronic voting system shall not be used in an election unless it is approved by the board of state canvassers ... and unless it meets 1 of the following conditions: (a) Is certified by an independent testing authority accredited by the national association of state election directors and by the board of state canvassers. (b) In the absence of an accredited independent testing authority, is certified by the manufacturer of the voting system as meeting or exceeding the performance and test standards referenced in subdivision (a) in a manner prescribed by the board of state canvassers.” [MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 168.795a](#) (2009).
- Applicable Regulation(s):** MI does not have a regulation regarding the federal certification process.
- State Certification Process:** The Secretary of State accepts requests from persons/corporations wishing to have their voting system examined. The requestor must pay the Secretary of State an application fee of \$1,500.00, file a report listing all of the states in which the voting system has been approved and any reports that these states have made regarding the performance of the voting system. The Board of State Canvassers conducts a field test involving Michigan electors and election officials in simulated election day conditions. The Board of State Canvassers shall approve the voting system if it meets all of the state requirements. [MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 168.795a](#) (2009).
- Fielded Voting Systems:** *[After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].*
http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,1607,7-127-1633_8716_45458---,00.html



WISCONSIN

<i>State Participation:</i>	Requires Testing by a Federally Accredited Laboratory. WI requires that its voting systems receive approval from an independent testing authority accredited by NASED verifying that the voting systems meet all of the recommended FEC standards.
<i>Applicable Statute(s):</i>	"No ballot, voting device, automatic tabulating equipment or relating equipment and materials to be used in an electronic voting system may be utilized in this state unless it is approved by the board [of election commissioners]." WIS. STAT.ANN. § 5.91 (West 2009).
<i>Applicable Regulation(s):</i>	"An application for approval of an electronic voting system shall be accompanied by all of the following ... [r]eports from an independent testing authority accredited by the national association of state election directors (NASED) demonstrating that the voting system conforms to all the standards recommended by the federal elections commission." WIS. ADMIN. CODE GAB § 7.01 (2009).
<i>State Certification Process:</i>	The Board of Election Commissioners accepts applications for the approval of electronic voting systems. Once the application is completed, the vendor must set up the voting system for three mock elections using: (1) offices, (2) referenda questions and (3) candidates. A panel of local election officials can assist the Board in the review of the voting system. The Board conducts the test using a mock election for the partisan primary, general election, and nonpartisan election. The Board may also require that the voting system be used in an actual election as a condition of the approval. WIS. ADMIN. CODE GAB §§ 7.01, 7.02 (2009).
<i>Fielded Voting Systems:</i>	<i>[After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].</i> http://elections.state.wi.us/section.asp?linkid=643&locid=47



GEORGIA

State Participation: **Requires Federal Certification.** GA requires that its voting systems are tested to EAC standards by EAC accredited labs and certified by the EAC.

Applicable Statute(s): "Any person or organization owning, manufacturing, or selling, or being interested in the manufacture or sale of, any voting machine may request the Secretary of State to examine the machine. Any ten or more electors of this state may, at any time, request the Secretary of State to reexamine any voting machine previously examined and approved by him or her. Before any such examination or reexamination, the person, persons, or organization requesting such examination or reexamination shall pay to the Secretary of State the reasonable expenses of such examination; provided, however, that in the case of a request by ten or more electors the examination fee shall be \$ 250.00. The Secretary of State may, at any time, in his or her discretion, reexamine any voting machine." [GA CODE ANN. § 21-2-324](#) (2008).

Applicable Regulation(s): "Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the *Voting Systems Standards* published by the EAC." [GA. COMP. R. & RES. 590-8-1-.01](#) (2009).

State Certification Process: After the voting system has passed EAC Qualification testing, the vendor of the voting system submits a letter to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for the voting system along with a technical data package to the certification agent. An evaluation proposal is created by the certification agent after a preliminary view of the Technical Data Package and sent to the vendor. Any additional EAC ITA testing identified in the evaluation proposal is arranged by the vendor and the certification agent will perform all other tests identified in the evaluation proposal. The certification agent submits a report of their findings to the Secretary of State. Based on these findings the Secretary of State will make a final determination on whether to certify the voting system. [GA. COMP. R. & RES. 590-8-1-.01](#) (2009).

Fielded Voting Systems: *[After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].*
<http://www.sos.georgia.gov/Elections/>



PENNSYLVANIA

<i>State Participation:</i>	Requires Testing by a Federally Accredited Laboratory. PA requires that its voting systems are approved by a federally recognized independent testing laboratory as meeting federal voting system standards.
<i>Applicable Statute(s):</i>	"Any person or corporation owning, manufacturing or selling, or being interested in the manufacture or sale of, any electronic voting system, may request the Secretary of the Commonwealth to examine such system if the voting system has been examined and approved by a federally recognized independent testing authority and if it meets any voting system performance and test standards established by the Federal Government." 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Code § 3031.5 (West 2008).
<i>Applicable Regulation(s):</i>	PA does not have a regulation regarding the federal certification process.
<i>State Certification Process:</i>	The Secretary of State examines voting systems, upon request, once the voting systems have received approval by a federally recognized independent testing authority. The person(s) requesting the examination of the voting system are responsible for the cost of the examination. After the examination, the Secretary of State issues a report stating whether or not the voting systems are safe and compliant with state and federal requirements. If the voting systems are deemed safe and compliant by the Secretary of State then the systems may be adopted and approved for use in elections by each county through a majority vote of its qualified electors. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Code §§ 3031.5, 3031.2 (West 2008).
<i>Fielded Voting Systems:</i>	<i>[After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].</i> http://www.votespa.com/HowtoVote/tabid/74/language/en-US/Default.aspx



ARIZONA

<i>State Participation:</i>	Requires Testing by a Federally Accredited Laboratory. AZ requires that its voting systems are HAVA compliant and approved by a laboratory that is accredited pursuant to HAVA.
<i>Applicable Statute(s):</i>	"On completion of acquisition of machines or devices that comply with HAVA, machines or devices used at any election for federal, state or county offices may only be certified for use in this state and may only be used in this state if they comply with HAVA and if those machines or devices have been tested and approved by a laboratory that is accredited pursuant to HAVA." ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-442(B) (2008).
<i>Applicable Regulation(s):</i>	AZ does not have a regulation regarding the federal certification process.
<i>State Certification Process:</i>	The Secretary of State appoints a committee of three people that test different voting systems. This committee is required to submit their recommendations to the Secretary of State who then makes the final decision on which voting system(s) to adopt. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-442(A) and (C) (2008).
<i>Fielded Voting Systems:</i>	<i>[After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].</i> http://www.azsos.gov/election/equipment/default.htm

17.

18. **Pro V& V** and **SLI Gaming** both lack evidence of EAC Accreditation as per the Voting System Testing and Certification Manual.

19. Pro V& V is owned and Operated by Jack Cobb. Real name is Ryan Jackson Cobb. The company ProV&V was founded and run by Jack Cobb who formerly worked under the entity of Wyle Laboratories which is an AEROSPACE DEFENSE CONTRACTING ENTITY. The address information on the EAC, NIST and other entities for Pro V& V are different than that of what is on ProV&V website. The [EAC](#) and NIST (ISO CERT) issuers all have another address.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://eac-legacy.ec-admin.com/working-equipment/working-systems-test-laboratories.asp?>. The page features a search bar with 'SEARCH' and 'CLEAR' buttons. Below the search bar, the heading 'Accredited Labs' is displayed, followed by '2 results found. Page 1 of 1'. Two lab entries are listed:

- Pro V&V**
700 Boulevard South
Suite 102
Huntsville, AL 35802
Status: Accredited
Program Manager: Jack Cobb, President
Phone: 256-713-1111
[Learn More >](#)
- SLI Compliance, a Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC**
4720 Independence Street
Wheat Ridge, CO 80033
Status: Accredited
Program Manager: Traci Mapes, Director of Operations
Phone: 303-422-1566
[Learn More >](#)

On the right side of the page, there are sections for 'Frequently Asked Questions', 'Manuals and Forms', 'Test and Certification Blogs', 'DO YOU HAVE QUESTIONS?' (with a 'Contact Us' button), and 'REGISTER TO VOTE!' (with a 'Register Today' button).

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL www.provandv.com/contact. The page is a contact form with the following fields:

- Your Name (required)
- Your Email (required)
- Subject
- Your Message

Below the form is a blue 'Send' button. To the right of the form, the contact information for Pro V&V is listed:

- Pro V&V
- 6725 Odyssey Drive NW
- Suite C
- Huntsville, AL 35890
- Office: 256-713-1111
- Fax: 256-713-1112

At the bottom of the page, there is a copyright notice: '© 2020 Pro V&V, Inc. All rights reserved.' and a 'Theme by Teemartek' logo. The Windows taskbar is visible at the bottom of the browser window, showing the time as 1:51 PM on 11/26/2020.

20. VSTLs are the most important component of the election machines as they examine the use of COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf)
21. “Wyle became involved with the testing of electronic voting systems in the early 1990’s and has tested over 150 separate voting systems. Wyle was the first company to obtain accreditation by the National Association of State Election Directors (NASSED). Wyle is accredited by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) as a Voting System Testing Laboratory (VSTL). Our scope of accreditation as a VSTL encompasses all aspects of the hardware and software of a voting machine. Wyle also received NVLAP accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025:2005 from NIST.” Testimony of Jack Cobb 2009
22. COTS are preferred by many because they have been tried and tested in the open market and are most economic and readily available. COTS are also the SOURCE of vulnerability therefore VSTLs are VERY important. COTS components by voting system machine manufacturers can be used as a “Black Box” and changes to their specs and hardware make up change continuously. Some changes can be simple upgrades to make them more efficient in operation, cost efficient for production, end of life (EOL) and even complete reworks to meet new standards. The key issue in this is that MOST of the COTS used by Election Machine Vendors like Dominion, ES&S, Hart Intercivic, Smartmatic and others is that such manufacturing for COTS have been outsourced to China which if implemented in our Election Machines make us vulnerable to BLACK BOX antics and backdoors due to hardware changes that can go undetected. This is why VSTL’s are VERY important.
23. The proprietary voting system software is done so and created with cost efficiency in mind and therefore relies on 3rd party software that is AVAILABLE and HOUSED on the HARDWARE. This is a vulnerability. Exporting system reporting using software like Crystal Reports, or PDF software allows for vulnerabilities with their constant updates.
24. As per the COTS hardware components that are fixed, and origin may be cloaked under proprietary information a major vulnerability exists since once again third-party support software is dynamic and requires FREQUENT updates. The hardware components of the computer components, and election machines that are COTS may have slight updates that can be overlooked as they may be like those designed that support the other third -party software. COTS origin is important and the US Intelligence Community report in 2018 verifies that.
25. The Trump Administration made it clear that there is an absence of a major U.S. alternative to foreign suppliers of networking equipment. This highlights the growing dominance of

Chinese manufacturers like Huawei that are the world's LARGEST supplier of telecom and other equipment that endangers national security.

26. China, is not the only nation involved in COTS provided to election machines or the networking but so is Germany via a LAOS founded Chinese linked cloud service company that works with SCYTL named Akamai Technologies that have offices in China and are linked to the server that Dominion Software.

28 046 Madrid

Asian offices

Akamai Technologies - India

111, Brigade Court
Koramangala Industrial Area
Bangalore 560 095, India

Telephone: 91-80-575-99222
Fax: 91-80-575-99209
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

Akamai Technologies - China

Suite 1560, 15th Floor
NCI Tower
12A Jianguomenwai Avenue
Chaoyang District,
Beijing 100022
China

Telephone: 86-10-8523-3097
Fax: 86-10-8523-3001
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

Akamai Japan K.K.

The Executive Centre Japan K.K.
15F Tokyo Ginko Kyokai building
1-3-1 Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0005

Telephone: 81-3-3216-7200 (Centre)
81-3-3216-7300 (Akamai direct)
Fax: 81-3-3216-7390 (Centre)
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

Akamai Technologies - Singapore

Akamai, Regus Centre, 36-01 UOB Plaza 1
80 Raffles Place
Singapore 048624
 Driving directions

Telephone: +65 6248 4614
Fax: +65 6248-4501
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

Akamai Technologies - Australia and New Zealand


201 Sussex St
Tower 2, Level 20
Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia
info@au.akamai.com

Telephone: 61 2 9006 1325
Fax: 61 2 9475 0343
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

ptt.gov resolves to 4.30.228.74. According to our data this IP address belongs to Level 3 Communications and is located in Alexandria, Virginia, United States. Please have a look at the information provided below for further details.


4.30.228.74

ISP/Organization	Level 3 Communications
Location	Alexandria 22304, Virginia (VA), United States (US)
Latitude	38.8115 / 38°48'41" N
Longitude	-77.1285 / 77°7'42" W
Timezone	America/New_York
Local Time	Thu, 12 Jul 2018 19:27:40 -0400



27.

28. L3 Level Communications is federal contractor that is partially owned by foreign lobbyist George Soros. An article that AP ran in 2010 – spoke out about the controversy of this that has been removed. ([LINK](#)) “As for the company’s other political connections, it also appears that none other than George Soros, the billionaire funder of the country’s liberal political infrastructure, owns 11,300 shares of OSI Systems Inc., the company that owns Rapiscan. Not surprisingly, OSI’s stock has appreciated considerably over the course of the year. Soros certainly is a savvy investor.” Washington Examiner re-write.



30.

31. **L-3 Communication Systems-East** designs, develops, produces and integrates communication systems and support equipment for space, air, ground, and naval applications, including C4I systems and products; integrated Navy communication systems; integrated space communications and RF payloads; recording systems; secure communications, and information security systems. In addition, their site claims that MARCOM is an integrated communications system and The Marcom® is the foundation of the Navy's newest digital integrated voice / data switching system for affordable command and control equipment supporting communications and radio room automation. The MarCom® uses the latest **COTS** digital technology and open systems standards to offer the command and control user a low cost, user friendly, solution to the complex voice, video and data communications needs of present and future joint / allied missions. Built in reliability, rugged construction, and fail-safe circuits ensure your call and messages will go through. Evidently a HUGE vulnerability.

32. Michigan's government site is thumped off Akamai Technologies servers which are housed on **TELIA AB** a foreign server located in Germany.
33. Scytl, who is contracted with AP that receives the results tallied BY Scytl on behalf of Dominion – During the elections the AP reporting site had a disclaimer.
AP – powered by SCYTL.

Advertisements	Basic Tracking Info
	<p>Domain: Michigan.gov [Whois Lookup] Domain Country Domain To IP</p> <p>IP Address: 23.78.81.34 [IP Blacklist Check]</p> <p>Reverse DNS: 34.81.78.23.in-addr.arpa</p> <p>Hostname: a23-78-81-34.deploy.static.akamaitechnologies.com</p> <p>a12-67.akam.net >> 184.26.160.67 a11-66.akam.net >> 84.53.139.66 a1-35.akam.net >> 193.108.91.35</p> <p>Nameservers: a5-66.akam.net >> 95.100.168.66 a18-64.akam.net >> 95.101.36.64 a24-65.akam.net >> 2.16.130.65</p>
	Location For an IP: Michigan.gov
	<p>Continent: North America (NA)</p> <p>Country: United States 🇺🇸 (US)</p> <p>Capital: \ashington</p> <p>State: Unknown</p> <p>City Location: Unknown</p> <p>ISP: Akamai Technologies</p> <p>Organization: Akamai Technologies</p> <p>AS Number: AS1299 Telia Company AB</p> <p>something went wrong! something went wrong!</p>
Geolocation on IP Map	<p>Time Zone: America/North_Dakota/Center</p> <p>Local Time: 13:48:46</p> <p>Timezone GMT offset: -21600</p> <p>Sunrise / Sunset: 07:27 / 17:12</p>
	Extra Information for an IP: Michigan.gov
	<p>Continent Lat/Lon: 46.07305 / -100.546</p> <p>Country Lat/Lon: 38 / -98</p> <p>City Lat/Lon: (37.751) / (-97.822)</p> <p>IP Language: English</p>

34. “Scytl was selected by the Federal Voting Assistance Program of the U.S. Department of Defense to provide a secure online ballot delivery and onscreen marking systems under a program to support overseas military and civilian voters for the 2010 election cycle and beyond. Scytl was awarded 9 of the 20 States that agreed to participate in the program (New York, Washington, Missouri, Nebraska, Kansas, New Mexico, South Carolina, Mississippi and Indiana), making it the provider with the highest number of participating States.” [PDF](#)
35. According to DOMINION : 1.4.1 Software and Firmware The software and firmware employed by Dominion D-Suite 5.5-A consists of 2 types, custom and commercial off the shelf (COTS). COTS applications were verified to be pristine or were subjected to source code review for analysis of any modifications and verification of meeting the pertinent standards.
36. The concern is the HARDWARE and the NON – ACCREDITED VSTLs as by their own admittance use COTS.
37. The purpose of VSTL’s being accredited and their importance in ensuring that there is no foreign interference/ bad actors accessing the tally data via backdoors in equipment software. The core software used by ALL SCYTL related Election Machine/Software manufacturers ensures “anonymity” .
38. Algorithms within the area of this “shuffling” to maintain anonymity allows for setting values to achieve a desired goal under the guise of “encryption” in the trap-door.
39. The actual use of trapdoor commitments in Bayer-Groth proofs demonstrate the implications for the verifiability factor. This means that no one can SEE what is going on during the process of the “shuffling” therefore even if you deploy an algorithms or manual scripts to fractionalize or distribute pooled votes to achieve the outcome you wish – you cannot prove they are doing it! See STUDY : [“The use of trapdoor commitments in Bayer-Groth proofs and the implications for the verifiability of the Scytl-SwissPost Internet voting system”](#)
40. **Key Terms**
41. **UNIVERSAL VERIFIABILITY:** Votes cast are the votes counted and integrity of the vote is verifiable (the vote was tallied for the candidate selected) . **SCYTL FAILS UNIVERSAL VERIFIABILITY** because no mathematical proofs can determine if any votes have been manipulated.
42. **INDIVIDUAL VERIFIABILITY:** Voter cannot verify if their ballot got correctly counted. Like, if they cast a vote for ABC they want to verify it was ABC. That notion clearly discounts the need for anonymity in the first place.

43. To understand what I observed during the 2020 I will walk you through the process of one ballot cast by a voter.
44. STEP 1 |Config Data | All non e-voting data is sent to Scytl (offshore) for configuration of data. All e-voting is sent to CONFIGURATION OF DATA then back to the e-voting machine and then to the next phase called CLEANSING. **CONCERNS:** Here we see an “OR PROOF” as coined by mathematicians – an “or proof” is that votes that have been pre-tallied parked in the system and the algorithm then goes back to set the outcome it is set for and seeks to make adjustments if there is a partial pivot present causing it to fail demanding manual changes such as block allocation and narrowing of parameters or self-adjusts to ensure the predetermined outcome is achieved.
45. STEP 2|CLEANSING | The Process is when all the votes come in from the software run by Dominion and get “cleansed” and put into 2 categories: invalid votes and valid votes.
46. STEP 3|Shuffling /Mixing | This step is the most nefarious and exactly where the issues arise and carry over into the decryption phase. Simply put, the software takes all the votes, literally mixes them a and then re-encrypts them. This is where if ONE had the commitment key- TRAPDOOR KEY – one would be able to see the parameters of the algorithm deployed as the votes go into this mixing phase, and how algorithm redistributes the votes.
47. This published PAPER FROM University College London depicts how this shuffle works. In essence, when this mixing/shuffling occurs, then one doesn’t have the ability to know that vote coming out on the other end is actually their vote; therefore, ZERO integrity of the votes when mixed.

48.

Background - ElGamal encryption

- **Setup:** Group \mathcal{G} of prime order q with generator g
- **Public key:** $pk = y = g^x$
- **Encryption:** $\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m; r) = (g^r, y^r m)$
- **Decryption:** $\mathcal{D}_x(u, v) = vu^{-x}$
- **Homomorphic:**

$$\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m; r) \times \mathcal{E}_{pk}(M; R) = \mathcal{E}_{pk}(mM; r + R)$$


- **Re-encryption:**

$$\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m; r) \times \mathcal{E}_{pk}(1; R) = \mathcal{E}_{pk}(m; r + R)$$



49. When this mixing/shuffling occurs, then one doesn't have the ability to know that vote coming out on the other end is actually their vote; therefore, ZERO integrity of the votes.

50. When the votes are sent to Scytel via Dominion Software EMS (Election Management System) the Trap Door is accessed by Scytel or TRAP DOOR keys (Commitment Parameters).



52. The encrypted data is shifted into Scytel's platform in the form of ciphertexts – this means it is encrypted and a key based on commitments is needed to read the data. The ballot data can only be read if the person has a key that is set on commitments.

53. A false sense of security is provided to both parties that votes are not being “REPLACED” during the mixing phase. Basically, Scytel re-encrypts the ballot data that comes in from Dominion (or any other voting software company) as ciphertexts. Scytel is supposed to prove that votes A, B, C are indeed X, Y, Z under their new re-encryption when sending back the votes that are tallied coding them respectively. This is done by Scytel and the Election Software company that agrees to certain

“Generators” and therefore together build “commitments.”

```
public CommitmentParams(final ZpSubgroup group, final int n) {
    group = group;
    h = GroupTools.getRandomElement(group);
    commitmentlength = n;
    g = GroupTools.getVectorRandomElement(group,
    this.commitmentlength);
}

// from getRandomElement(group)
Exponent randomExponent = ExponentTools.getRandomExponent(group.getQ());
return group.getGenerator().exponentiate(randomExponent);
```

54. Scytl and Dominion have an agreement – only the two would know the parameters. This means that access is able to occur through backdoors in hardware if the parameters of the commitments are known in order to alter the range of the algorithm deployed to satisfy the outcome sought in the case of algorithm failure.
55. Trapdoor is a cryptotech term that describes a state of a program that knows the commitment parameters and therefore is able change the value of the commitments however it likes. In other words, Scytl or anyone that knows the commitment parameters can take all the votes and give them to any one they want. If they have a total of 1000 votes an algorithm can distribute them among all races as it deems necessary to achieve the goals it wants. (Case Study: Estonia)

$$\text{Commitment}_{\text{CRYPT}} = \text{CM}_c$$

Scytl sets commitment - simple math ↓

$$\text{CM}_c(\vec{\alpha}; r) = \mathcal{H} \prod_{i=1}^n G_i^{\alpha_i}$$

$$\text{CM}_c(\vec{\alpha}; r) \stackrel{\downarrow}{=} \mathcal{H} \left(r + \sum_{i=1}^n (\alpha_i - z_i) e_i \right) \prod_{i=1}^n G_i^{z_i}$$


$$\text{CM}_c(\vec{\alpha}; r) = \text{CM}_c(\vec{z}; r')$$

$$r' = r + \sum_{i=1}^n e_i (\alpha_i - z_i)$$

56.

57. Within the trapdoor this is how the algorithm behaves to move the goal posts in elections without being detected by this proof . During the mixing phase this is the algorithm you would use to

“reallocate” votes via an algorithm to achieve the goal set.




58. STEP 4|Decryption would be the decryption phase and temporary parking of vote tallies before reporting. In this final phase before public release the tallies are released from encrypted format into plain text. As previously explained, those that know the trapdoor can easily change any votes that the randomness is applied and used to generate the tally vote ciphertext. Thus in this case, ScytI who is the mixer can collude with their vote company clients or an agency (-----) to change votes and get away with it. This is because the receiver doesn't have the decryption key so they rely solely on ScytI to be *honest* or free from any foreign actors within their backdoor or the Election Company (like Dominion) that can have access to the key.
59. In fact, a study from the University of Bristol made claim that interference can be seen when there is a GREAT DELAY in reporting and finalizing numbers University of Bristol : [How not to Prove Yourself: Pitfalls of the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic and Applications to Helios](#)
60. “Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge allow a prover to convince a verifier that she holds information satisfying some desirable properties without revealing anything else.” David Bernhard, Olivier Pereira, and Bogdan Warinschi.

61. Hence, you can't prove anyone manipulated anything. The TRAP DOOR KEY HOLDERS can offer you enough to verify to you what you need to see without revealing anything and once again indicating the inability to detect manipulation. **ZERO PROOF of INTEGRITY OF THE VOTE.**
62. Therefore, if decryption is challenged, the administrator or software company that knows the trap door key can provide you proof that would be able to pass verification (blind). This was proven to be factually true in the case study by The University of Melbourne in March. White Hat Hackers purposely altered votes by knowing the parameters set in the commitments and there was no way to prove they did it – or any way to prove they didn't.
63. IT'S THE PERFECT THREE CARD MONTY. That's just how perfect it is. They fake a proof of ciphertexts with KNOWN "RANDOMNESS". This rolls back to the integrity of the VOTE. The vote is not safe using these machines not only because of the method used for ballot "cleansing" to maintain anonymity but the EXPOSURE to foreign interference and possible domestic bad actors.
64. In many circumstances, manipulation of the algorithm is NOT possible in an undetectable fashion. This is because it is one point heavy. Observing the elections in 2020 confirm the deployment of an algorithm due to the BEHAVIOR which is indicative of an algorithm in play that had no pivoting parameters applied.
65. The behavior of the algorithm is that one point (B) is the greatest point within the allocated set. It is the greatest number within the A B points given. Point A would be the smallest. Any points outside the A B points are not necessarily factored in yet can still be applied.
66. The points outside the parameters can be utilized to a certain to degree such as in block allocation.
67. The algorithm geographically changed the parameters of the algorithm to force blue votes and ostracize red.
68. Post block allocation of votes the two points of the algorithm were narrowed ensuring a BIDEN win hence the observation of NO Trump Votes and some BIDEN votes for a period of time.

ARIZONA


"FIXING" THE VOTE



SUMMARY

- Mathematical evidence of the seeding "injection" of votes at the beginning
- A spike means that a large number of votes were injected into the totals
- A normal vote pattern would look like a natural progression – smooth without extreme jumps

70. Gaussian Elimination without pivoting explains how the algorithm would behave and the election results and data from Michigan confirm FAILURE of algorithm.



71. The "Digital Fix" observed with an increased spike in VOTES for Joe Biden can be determined as evidence of a pivot. Normally it would be assumed that the algorithm had a Complete Pivot. Wilkinson's demonstrated the guarantee as :

$$\frac{\|U\|_{\infty}}{\|A\|_{\infty}} \leq n^{\frac{1}{2}} \log(n)$$

72.


73. Such a conjecture allows the growth factor the ability to be upper bound by values closer to n. Therefore, complete pivoting can't be observed because there would be too many floating points. Nor can partial as the partial pivoting would overwhelm after the "injection" of votes. Therefore, external factors were used which is evident from the "DIGITAL FIX"

74. Observing the elections, after a review of Michigan's data a spike of 54,199 votes to Biden. Because it is pushing and pulling and keeping a short distance between the 2 candidates; but then a spike, which is how an algorithm presents; - and this spike means there was a pause and an insert was made, where they insert an algorithm. Block spikes in votes for JOE BIDEN were NOT paper

ballots being fed or THUMB DRIVES. The algorithm block adjusted itself and the PEOPLE were creating the evidence to BACK UP the block allocation.

- 75. I have witnessed the same behavior of the election software in countries outside of the United States and within the United States. In -----, the elections conducted behaved in the same manner by allocating BLOCK votes to the candidate “chosen” to win.
- 76. Observing the data of the contested states (and others) the algorithm deployed is identical to that which was deployed in 2012 providing Barack Hussein Obama a block allocation to win the 2012 Presidential Elections.
- 77. The algorithm looks to have been set to give Joe Biden a 52% win even with an initial 50K+ vote block allocation was provided initially as tallying began (as in case of Arizona too). In the am of November 4, 2020 the algorithm stopped working, therefore another “block allocation” to remedy the failure of the algorithm. This was done manually as ALL the SYSTEMS shut down NATIONWIDE to avoid detection.

GEORGIA “FIXING” THE VOTE



SUMMARY


- The spike on the morning of Nov. 4 resulted in a net increase of 107,040 to Biden's total
- A spike means that a large number of votes were injected into the totals
- A normal vote pattern would look like a natural progression – smooth without

- 78.
- 79. In Georgia during the 2016 Presidential Elections a failed attempt to deploy the scripts to block allocate votes from a centralized location where the “trap-door” key lay an attempt by someone using

the DHS servers was detected by the state of GA. The GA leadership assumed that it was “Russians” but later they found out that the IP address was that of DHS.

80. In the state of Wisconsin, we observed a considerable BLOCK vote allocation by the algorithm at the SAME TIME it happened across the nation. All systems shut down at around the same time.

Total presidential votes for each party so far, with 89 percent of Wisconsin’s expected vote counted as of 6:23 a.m on Nov. 4



81.

82. In Wisconsin there are also irregularities in respect to BALLOT requests. (names AND address Hidden for privacy)

F	G	H	V	W	X	Y	AB	AC	AD	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL	AN
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/01/2020	Online	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Online	11/01/2020				
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	10/23/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	10/23/2020	10/23/2020			
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/01/2020	Online	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Online	11/01/2020				
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/01/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/01/2020	Email	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Mail	10/31/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/01/2020	Email	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Mail	10/31/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Received In Person	Hospitaliz		Official	Active	Returned	Appointed Agent	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Email	Hospitaliz		Official	Active	Returned	Appointed Agent	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	Mail											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Mail	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Appointed Agent	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Mail	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Appointed Agent	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	Online	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Online	11/02/2020				
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	Online	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Online	11/02/2020				
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	FPCA	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Mail	11/02/2020				
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	FPCA	Military		Official	Active	Returned	Email	11/02/2020	11/03/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/03/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	inactive	Voter Spoiled	Voted in Person	11/03/2020	11/03/2020			
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/03/2020	Mail	Military	Certification insufficient	Federal Absent	Active	Returned, to be Rejected	Mail	11/03/2020	11/03/2020			
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/03/2020	Mail	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Mail	11/03/2020				
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/03/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/03/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online											
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83.

Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/03/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
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Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/06/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/06/2020	Online

84. I can personally attest that in 2013 discussions by the Obama / Biden administration were being had with various agencies in the deployment of such election software to be deployed in ----- in 2013.
85. On or about April 2013 a one year plan was set to fund and usher elections in -----.
86. Joe Biden was designated by Barack Hussein Obama to ensure the ----- accepted assistance.
87. John Owen Brennan and James (Jim) Clapper were responsible for the ushering of the intelligence surrounding the elections in -----.
88. Under the guise of Crisis support the US Federal Tax Payers funded the deployment of the election software and machines in ----- signing on with Scytl.

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release

April 21, 2014

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FACT SHEET: U.S. Crisis Support Package for Ukraine

President Obama and Vice President Biden have made U.S. support for Ukraine an urgent priority as the Ukrainian government works to establish security and stability, pursue democratic elections and constitutional reform, revive its economy, and ensure government institutions are transparent and accountable to the Ukrainian people. Ukraine embarks on this reform path in the face of severe challenges to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, which we are working to address together with Ukraine and our partners in the international community. The United States is committed to ensuring that Ukrainians alone are able to determine their country's future without intimidation or coercion from outside forces. To support Ukraine, we are today announcing a new package of assistance totaling \$50 million to help Ukraine pursue political and economic reform and strengthen the partnership between the United States and Ukraine.

91. Right before the ----- elections it was alleged that CyberBerkut a pro-Russia group infiltrated --- central election computers and deleted key files. These actions supposedly rendered the vote-tallying system inoperable.
92. In fact, the KEY FILES were the Commitment keys to allow Scytl to tally the votes rather than the election machines. The group had disclosed emails and other documents proving that their election was rigged and that they tried to avoid a fixed election.
93. The elections were held on May 25, 2014 but in the early AM hours the election results were BLOCKED and the final tally was DELAYED flipping the election in favor of -----.
94. The claim was that there was a DDoS attack by Russians when in actual fact it was a mitigation of the algorithm to inject block votes as we observed was done for Joe Biden because the KEYS were unable to be deployed. In the case of -----, the trap-door key was “altered”/deleted/ rendered ineffective. In the case of the US elections, representatives of Dominion/ ES&S/ Smartmatic/ Hart Intercivic would have to manually deploy them since if the entry points into the systems seemed to have failed.
95. The vote tallying of all states NATIONWIDE stalled and hung for days – as in the case of Alaska that has about 300K registered voters but was stuck at 56% reporting for almost a week.
96. This “hanging” indicates a failed deployment of the scripts to block allocate remotely from one location as observed in ----- on May 26, 2014.
97. This would justify the presence of the election machine software representatives making physical appearances in the states where the election results are currently being contested.
98. A Dominion Executive appeared at the polling center in Detroit after midnight.
99. Considering that the hardware of the machines has NOT been examined in Michigan since 2017 by Pro V& V according to Michigan’s own reporting. COTS are an avenue that hackers and bad actors seek to penetrate in order to control operations. Their software updates are the reason vulnerabilities to foreign interference in all operations exist.
100. The importance of VSTLs is underrated to protect up from foreign interference by way of open access via COTS software. Pro V& V who’s EAC certification EXPIRED on 24 FEB 2017 was contracted with the state of WISCONSIN.
101. In the United States each state is tasked to conduct and IV& V (Independent Verification and Validation) to provide assurance of the integrity of the votes.
102. If the “accredited” non-federal entities have NOT received EAC accreditation this is a failure of the states to uphold their own states standards that are federally regulated.
103. In addition, if the entities had NIST certificates they are NOT sufficing according the HAVA ACT 2002 as the role of NIST is clear.
104. Curiously, both companies PRO V&V and SLI GAMING received NIST certifications OUTSIDE the 24 month scope.

105. PRO V& V received a NIST certification on 26MAR2020 for ONE YEAR. Normally the NIST certification is good for two years to align with that of EAC certification that is good for two years.



106.

107. The last PRO V& V EAC accreditation certificate (Item 8) of this declaration expired in February 2017 which means that the IV & V conducted by Michigan claiming that they were accredited is false.

108. The significance of VSTLs being accredited and examining the HARDWARE is key. COTS software updates are the avenues of entry.

109. As per DOMINION'S own petition, the modems they use are COTS therefore failure to have an accredited VSTL examine the hardware for points of entry by their software is key.

*Compact Flash Cards	***SanDisk Ultra: SDCFHS-004G SDCFHS-008G RiData: CFC-14A RDF8G-233XMCB2-1 RDF16G-233XMCB2-1 RDF32G-233XMCB2-1 SanDisk Extreme: SDCFX-016G SDCFX-032G SanDisk: SDFAA-008G		Memory device for ICP and ICE tabulators.
*Modems	Verizon USB Modem Pantech UMW190NCD USB Modem MultiTech MT9234MU CellGo Cellular Modem E-Device 3GPUSUS AT&T USB Modem MultiTech GSM MTD- H5 Fax Modem US Robotics 56K V.92.		Analog and wireless modems for transmitting unofficial election night results.

110.

111. For example and update of Verizon USB Modem Pantech undergoes multiple software updates a year for it's hardware. That is most likely the point of entry into the systems.

112. During the 2014 elections in ---- it was the modems that gave access to the systems where the commitment keys were deleted.

113. SLI Gaming is the other VSTL "accredited" by the EAC BUT there is no record of their accreditation. In fact, SLI was NIST ISO Certified 27 days before the election which means that PA IV&V was conducted without NIST cert for SLI being valid.

United States Department of Commerce
National Institute of Standards and Technology



Certificate of Accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025:2017

NVLAP LAB CODE: 200733-0

SLI Compliance
Wheat Ridge, CO

*is accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for specific services,
listed on the Scope of Accreditation, for:*

Voting System Testing

*This laboratory is accredited in accordance with the recognized International Standard ISO/IEC 17025:2017.
This accreditation demonstrates technical competence for a defined scope and the operation of a laboratory quality
management system (refer to joint ISO-ILAC-IAF Communiqué dated January 2009).*

2020-10-07 through 2020-12-31
Effective Dates



[Signature]
For the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program

- 114.
115. In fact SLI was NIST ISO Certified for less than 90 days.
116. I can personally attest that high-level officials of the Obama/Biden administration and large private contracting firms met with a software company called GEMS which is ultimately the software ALL election machines run now running under the flag of DOMINION.
117. GEMS was manifested from SOE software purchased by SCYTL developers and US Federally Funded persons to develop it.
118. The only way GEMS can be deployed across ALL machines is IF all counties across the nation are housed under the same server networks.
119. GEMS was tasked in 2009 to a contractor in Tampa, Fl.
120. GEMS was also fine-tuned in Latvia, Belarus, Serbia and Spain to be localized for EU deployment as observed during the Swissport election debacle.
121. John McCain's campaign assisted in FUNDING the development of GEMS web monitoring via WEB Services with 3EDC and Dynology.

**SCHEDULE B-P
ITEMIZED DISBURSEMENTS**

Use separate schedule(s) for each category of the Detailed Summary Page

FOR LINE NUMBER: (check only one)

23 24 25 26 27a
 27b 28a 28b 28c 29

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
NAME OF COMMITTEE (In Full)
JOHN MCCAIN 2008, INC.

Full Name (Last, First, Middle Initial) A. 3EDC LLC		Date of Disbursement MM / DD / YYYY 03 / 17 / 2008
Mailing Address 211 NORTH UNION ST STE 200		Transaction ID : SB23.10515
City ALEXANDRIA State VA Zip Code 22314	Amount of Each Disbursement this Period 399916.09	
Purpose of Disbursement WEB SERVICE	Candidate Name	Category/ Type
Office Sought: <input type="checkbox"/> House <input type="checkbox"/> Senate <input type="checkbox"/> President Disbursement For: 2008 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Primary <input type="checkbox"/> General <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) ▼	State: District:	
Full Name (Last, First, Middle Initial) B. A FARE EXTRAORDINAIRE		Date of Disbursement MM / DD / YYYY 03 / 17 / 2008
Mailing Address 2035 MARSHALL		Transaction ID : SB23.10049
City HOUSTON State TX Zip Code 77098	Amount of Each Disbursement this Period 23697.69	
Purpose of Disbursement FACILITY RENTAL/CATERING	Candidate Name	Category/ Type
Office Sought: <input type="checkbox"/> House <input type="checkbox"/> Senate <input type="checkbox"/> President Disbursement For: 2008 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Primary <input type="checkbox"/> General <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) ▼	State: District:	
Full Name (Last, First, Middle Initial) C. ADMINISTAFF		Date of Disbursement MM / DD / YYYY 03 / 05 / 2008
Mailing Address PO BOX 203332		Transaction ID : SB23.10117
City HOUSTON State TX Zip Code 77216	Amount of Each Disbursement this Period 483.68	
Purpose of Disbursement INSURANCE	Candidate Name	Category/ Type
Office Sought: <input type="checkbox"/> House <input type="checkbox"/> Senate <input type="checkbox"/> President Disbursement For: 2008 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Primary <input type="checkbox"/> General <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) ▼	State: District:	
Subtotal Of Receipts This Page (optional)		424097.46
Total This Period (last page this line number only)		

- 122.
- 123.
- 124. AKAMAI Technologies services SCYTL.

125. AKAMAI Technologies Houses ALL foreign government sites. (Please see White Paper by Akamai.)


126. AKAMAI Technologies houses ALL .gov state sites. (ref Item 123 Wisconsin.gov Example)



127.

128. Wisconsin has EDGE GATEWAY port which is AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES based out of GERMANY.

129. Using AKAMAI Technologies is allowing .gov sites to obfuscate and mask their systems by way of HURRICANE ELECTRIC (he.net) Kicking it to anonymous (AKAMAI Technologies) offshore servers.



130.

131. AKAMAI Technologies has locations around the world.

132. AKAMAI Technologies has locations in China (ref item 22)

133. AKAMAI Technologies has locations in Iran as of 2019.

134. AKAMAI Technologies merged with UNICOM (CHINESE TELECOMM) in 2018.

135. AKAMAI Technologies house all state .gov information in GERMANY via TELIA AB.

136. In my professional opinion, this affidavit presents unambiguous evidence:
137. That there was Foreign interference, complicit behavior by the previous administrations from 1999 up until today to hinder the voice of the people and US persons knowingly and willingly colluding with foreign powers to steer our 2020 elections that can be named in a classified setting.
138. Foreign interference is present in the 2020 election in various means namely,
139. Foreign nationals assisted in the creation of GEMS (Dominion Software Foundation)
140. Akamai Technologies merged with a Chinese company that makes the COTS components of the election machines providing access to our electronic voting machines.
141. Foreign investments and interests in the creation of the GEMS software.
142. US persons holding an office and private individuals knowingly and willingly oversaw fail safes to secure our elections.
143. The EAC failed to abide by standards set in HAVA ACT 2002.
144. The IG of the EAC failed to address complaints since their appointment regarding vote integrity
145. Christy McCormick of the EAC failed to ensure that EAC conducted their duties as set forth by HAVA ACT 2002
146. Both Patricia Layfield (IG of EAC) and Christy McCormick (Chairwoman of EAC) were appointed by Barack Hussein Obama and have maintained their positions since then.
147. The EAC failed to have a quorum for over a calendar year leading to the inability to meet the standards of the EAC.
148. AKAMAI Technologies and Hurricane Electric raise serious concerns for NATSEC due to their ties with foreign hostile nations.
149. For all the reasons above a complete failure of duty to provide safe and just elections are observed.
150. For the people of the United States to have confidence in their elections our cybersecurity standards should not be in the hands of foreign nations.
151. Those responsible within the Intelligence Community directly and indirectly by way of procurement of services should be held accountable for assisting in the development, implementation and promotion of GEMS.
152. GEMS ----- General Hayden.
153. In my opinion and from the data and events I have observed ----- with the assistance of SHADOWNET under the guise of L3-Communications which is MPRI. This is also confirmed by us.army.mil making the statement that shadownet has been deployed to 30 states which all

happen to be using Dominion Machines.

FAIRFAX, Va. -The Virginia National Guard's Bowling Green-based 91st Cyber Brigade completed the nationwide rollout of its ShadowNet enterprise solution July 19, 2019, with the integration of the 125th Cyber Protection Battalion into the solution's virtual private network. ShadowNet is a custom-built private cloud-based out of the brigade's data center in Fairfax, Virginia, that uses VPN connectivity to provide its aligned units with 24-hour, seven-days-a-week remote access to critical cyber training at both the collective and individual levels. The brigade successfully integrated its three other cyber protection battalions - the 123rd, 124th, and 126th Cyber Protection Battalions - into the ShadowNet platform last January.

"I'm extremely proud to announce that the Soldiers of the 91st Cyber Brigade have completed the construction and rollout of ShadowNet, a world-class enterprise solution designed to propel operational innovation in the field of cyber training," said Col. Adam C. Volant, commander of the 91st Cyber Brigade. "ShadowNet will allow us to leverage the expertise of cyber professionals across our four cyber protection battalions to build Soldier-centric programs and collective training environments that deliver breakthroughs in exercise complexity and cost efficiency. Its robust

OCTOBER 26, 2020
U.S. Army STAND-TO! | Army Readiness Training

SEPTEMBER 12, 2019
September 2017 Nominative Sergeant Major Assignments

SEPTEMBER 12, 2019
DA ANNOUNCES ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS

154. Based on my research of voter data – it appears that there are approximately 23,000 residents of a Department of Corrections Prison with requests for absentee ballot in Wisconsin. We are currently reviewing and verifying the data and will supplement.

	23230	Gutierrez	Imaly	Janie		(202)994-9050	
23231	23231	Hansen	Luann	M		(262)994-9050	
23232	23232	Nebberman	John	C		(262)994-9050	
23233	23233	Reynolds	Devi	J		(262)994-9050	
23234	23234	Rieckhoff	Kathryn	Susan		(262)994-9050	
23235	23235	Edwards	Mark	Landon		(262)994-9050	
23236	23236	Pfeiffer	Joseph	Patrick		(262)994-9050	
23237	23237	Hines	Dianna	K		(262)994-9050	
23238	23238	Beachem	Janice	F		(262)994-9050	
23239	23239	Blackstone	Thomas	Wayne		(262)994-9050	
23240	23240	Braun	Patricia	Ann		(262)994-9050	
23241	23241	Smith	Raymond	L		(262)994-9050	
23242	23242	Meyer	Steven	R		(262)994-9050	
23243	23243	Vincent	Herbert			(262)994-9050	
23244	23244	Guajardo	Juan	P		(262)994-9050	
23245	23245	Wallace	Kirk	R		(262)994-9050	
23246	23246	Kaplan	Bernard	L		(262)994-9050	
23247	23247	Bahrs	Michelle	M		(262)994-9050	
23248	23248	Shattuck	Elizabeth	L		(262)994-9050	
23249	23249	Munoz	Rosalio	S	JR	(262)994-9050	
23250	23250	Strunk	Amy	C		(262)994-9050	
23251	23251	Schendel	Michael	P	JR	(262)994-9050	
23252	23252	Mack	Kimberly	N		(262)994-9050	
23253	23253	Spikes	Debra	A		(262)994-9050	
23254	23254	Busarow	Suzanne	M		(262)994-9050	
23255	23255	Oliver	Timmy			(262)994-9050	
23256	23256	Wember	Jimmy	Dean		(262)994-9050	
23257	23257	Kosterman	Michael	Richard		(262)994-9050	
23258	23258	Szaradowski	Paul	M		(262)994-9050	
23259	23259	Oliver	Dale			(262)994-9050	
23260	23260	Derango	Nancy			(262)994-9050	
23261	23261	Smith	Arthur	J		(262)994-9050	SMITH24.3059@YAHOO
23262	23262	Brown	Michael	Edward		(262)994-9050	

I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Executed this November 29th, 2020.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Terpsehore P Maras', written in a cursive style.

Terpsehore P Maras

Comments to the Board of Elections for the Nov. 27, 2023 meeting

From William Towne

To the Board of Elections:

This summer, Allegheny County officials including David Voye and County attorneys testified and argued that mail-in and absentee ballots are NOT official ballots once a voter marks them with selections. However, there are many contests in the most recent election where the outcome based on what the County apparently considers to be “official” ballots (i.e. excluding mail-in and absentee) is DIFFERENT from the outcome which considers the mail-in and absentee ballots as “official” ballots. I ask the Board of Elections to either (a) refuse to certify results of an election determined by anything other than official ballots OR (b) pass a resolution overriding these administrative positions and clearly declaring that mail-in and absentee ballots remain official ballots even after they have been marked by voters, returned to the County, and counted.

I also request a resolution directing the County to comply with records retention and transparency laws instead of seeking to maximize costs county voters seeking what the Election Code clearly describes as public records. It should be simple to get these records on request, instead of the County’s strategy of requiring each request to cost five figures in legal fees to go through court processes.

Similarly, I would like to request better observability of election procedures at the warehouse on election day. At least, we should have written procedures for ballot handling, ballot remaking, and ballot mixing that preserve both secret ballot and verifiable integrity in the counting process. For example, when ballots are remade (e.g., because they arrive unscannable) the County has a single employee or contractor doing the task according to inconsistent procedures they make up and vary as they please, too far away from the observers to see what ballot selections the voter made or verify that the “remade” ballot accurately reflects those choices, and the new “remade” ballots are collected without the corresponding original ballots, which could easily lead to accidental reduplication of those ballots. The County already has an issue with double-counting some ballots that arrive scannable from voters; it has not responded to or informed the public of any update in response to earlier public comments.

The lack of transparency, especially in such clear violation of the law, engenders mistrust in election officials and election results. It is an easy problem to fix and should be fixed now.

Refusing to take these steps now can easily lead to challenges and a lack of peace in post-election outcomes, especially next year. The Jan. 6, 2021 riot at the Capitol showed how strongly some people, including those in highly armed groups, feel about these issues and could be just a preview of what is in store if we don’t take the simple steps to fix these issues available to us now. Some simple resolutions from this Board at this meeting could significantly enhance compliance with the law and best practices. This can help ensure that the public can have justified confidence that election results are decided by will of the voters as expressed on official ballots each counted exactly once. Please do not certify the results of this election without passing the resolutions discussed above. Additional details can be found in prior public comments and I would welcome a follow-up conversation with any Board members who have remaining questions. Thank you for your time and attention to these matters.

-William Towne

