

Voye, David

From: Blair Stackhouse <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 4:09 PM
To: # Board of Elections
Subject: Comments for June 5 Board of Elections Meeting

Warning! This email was sent from an external source. Please be sure you recognize the sender and use caution when clicking on links and/or opening attachments.

Hello!

I am the elected Majority Inspector of Ward 7 District 10 in Pittsburgh and have worked at that polling station since the 2020 primary. I sent an email with the specific person I am concerned about to David Voye and Tom Duerr on 5/30, but I had overall questions as well:

- How does the Elections Division keep track of people who are problem poll workers?
- Is there an official channel for poll workers to submit complaints about the others who work with them that is not trying to talk to the county employees day of?
- Why would the Elections Division ask someone who has a long list of complaints to work at a polling station for the May primary and other elections?
- If someone uses the information in the poll book to find a voter's address and go to their house, is this counter to any regulation? If not, why is there no regulation in place? If it is, are there any repercussions?

I appreciate your attention to these questions and look forward to learning more about the process.

Thanks!
Blair Stackhouse

Voye, David

From: Brenda Forman <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 12:49 AM
To: # Board of Elections
Subject: Submission for 06052023 BOE meeting: History of US Voting Machines

Warning! This email was sent from an external source. Please be sure you recognize the sender and use caution when clicking on links and/or opening attachments.

I would like to submit, for the record, the following article written by Emerald Robinson on the recent history of voting machines in the United States. It gives greater definition to the "black box" of the ownership apparatus of the voting machine companies. It calls a great deal into question: how can we trust the machines if we know nothing about the companies that own them?

More questions about how we got here in our voting processes?


Chain of custody questions when ballots are being mailed in or adjudicated?

Transparency lacking on so many levels.

The time has come to say goodbye to the machines and return to hand counted paper ballots that are counted and verified in the precinct in which they were cast. Verify them with a high school civics class to get them involved as active and responsible citizens in the processes of how a Representative Republic operates.

This, with a few other adjustments, will restore trust and confidence in the voting system and increase participation of the many, which in turn will have the citizenry becoming the Representative Republic that our Founders envisioned.

Thank you.
Brenda Forman
Pittsburgh 15232



How One Man Ran America's Election System
For 40 Years
emerald.tv

How One Man Ran America's Election System
For 40 Years

This is why Bev Harris called it “black box voting” — because tracing the ownership of America’s electronic voting machine companies is impossible, and that’s on purpose.

This shell game with shell companies owning America’s voting machines was just beginning too. Bob Urosevich left *American Information Systems* — which is the company that he founded — to join another company called *Global Election Systems* in 1994. A year later, Bob starts *his third voting machine company* — called *I-Mark Systems* — which sells a new touch screen voting system.

Two years after Bob starts *I-Mark Systems*, that new company is acquired by — can you guess the right answer by now? — *Global Election Systems* which also employs Bob Urosevich of course. In fact, Bob is formally announced as CEO of *Global Election Systems* in 2000 — but who are we kidding at this point?

To sum it all up: the history of black box voting in America is largely the story of printing paper salesman Bob Urosevich buying and selling companies associated with Bob Urosevich.



Image: Page 107 from Bev Harris’ book.

While Bob was busy with *I-Mark Systems* and *Global Election Systems* in 1997, his old company *American Information Systems* changed its name to *ES&S* after supposedly buying up the biggest player in the election industry, *Business Records Corporation* (BRC).

I say “supposedly” because BRC had *bought out everyone else* supplying county and local governments with election materials and services in a two-year frenzy that was suspicious too.

So Diebold Election Systems changed its name to Premier Election Solutions. Can you guess what happened next? Remember, dear readers, *black box voting is a shell game*. The [National Election Defense Coalition](#) explained it:

In 2009, Diebold, which makes ATMs and other security systems, got out of the elections business altogether, selling Premier to ES&S. Here was a windfall for the Urosevich brothers in more than one sense: Bob had decamped to Diebold in 2002, when the company bought Global Election Systems, where he then served as president. Todd, meanwhile, remained at ES&S. This cozy arrangement was disrupted by a Justice Department antitrust intervention, which forced ES&S to split ownership of Premier with Dominion, the next big name in election technology. A month later, the deck was shuffled once again with Dominion's purchase of Sequoia.

Between them, Dominion and ES&S now count the majority of American ballots. There are, of course, newer technologies in development, including Web-based voting. This latest innovation is being peddled by the Spanish-owned ScytI, which named Bob Urosevich managing director of its Americas division in 2006.

The next time you vote, remember the man who really counts them: Bob Urosevich.

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Voye, David

From: Michele Feingold <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 9:52 AM
To: # Board of Elections
Subject: certification of election results

Warning! This email was sent from an external source. Please be sure you recognize the sender and use caution when clicking on links and/or opening attachments.

I am writing to respectfully ask the Board to properly certify the results of the May 16 Primary Election. While a primary is unlikely to generate the kind of spurious challenges we saw in the November general election, I want to take this opportunity to voice my complete and total repudiation of permitting cynical, baseless objections to the election results to prevail in any precinct and justify a delay in certification. That was an exceedingly dangerous precedent set by some members of this Board in November. It encourages the election deniers who have no regard for facts, evidence, or their fellow voters' rights to continue to seek to impose their will on the rest of us. It was a serious mistake which must never be repeated, lest we lose our fragile democracy entirely.

Thank you.

Michele Feingold
[REDACTED]
Pittsburgh 15217

Voye, David

From: Matthew Van Bibber <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 9:13 AM
To: # Board of Elections
Subject: Written public comment, duplicate ballots

Warning! This email was sent from an external source. Please be sure you recognize the sender and use caution when clicking on links and/or opening attachments.

Please add this to written comments for the June 5th 2023 board meeting.

Hi borad members and election dept.,

I have not recieved any questions or asked for any data that I have on the 2020 duplicated ballots. I am concerned about this and the public is as well.

Please provide a status update on the actions that will be taken, including any written policies and procedures that have been updated or written. Also please let us know once the correct 2020 general elections totals have been corrected on the online site once the dupillicates have been removed.

I can get you in touch with a few different companies that do this type of work and can help do and proper investigation, writeup and how to correct the issues. Again, I would like to be involved and I think it would be a good idea to have an outside 3rd party to help with this, so trust can be rebuilt with the community.

Please reachout to me at this email or phone number.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Voye, David

From: Juliet Zavon <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 3:22 PM
To: # Board of Elections
Subject: submitting my public comment

Warning! This email was sent from an external source. Please be sure you recognize the sender and use caution when clicking on links and/or opening attachments.

I am Julie Zavon. I live at [REDACTED], Pittsburgh 15217. This is the public comment I'm submitting for the record.

Post-election Audits: Give the Public More Information

Public Comment to the Allegheny County Board of Elections

June 5, 2023

by Juliet Zavon

Post-election audits are vital to confirming that election equipment has functioned properly and the tabulated results of an election are indeed the correct results. There are two types of post-election audits required by law in PA.

- The first requires that 2,000 ballots or 2% of the ballots, whichever is fewer, are recounted by hand to check that they were correctly tabulated.
- The second is a risk limiting audit. The number of ballots to be checked is determined by applying statistical analysis to the margin of victory in a race. The tighter the margin, the larger the number of ballots that must be recounted to confirm with statistical confidence that the tabulated result is accurate. Risk limiting audits are the gold standard of post-election audits.

The Elections Division needs to give the public information about when and how it conducts these audits and what the results are. The public should be able to check these audits and monitor the process just as the public can observe other election preparations and procedures. It is not enough to say that these audits are required by law. More transparency and more information is needed.

I urge you to post and publicize the results of your post-election audits of the May 2023 Primary. I urge you to invite the public, the media, campaigns, and civic organizations to observe post-election audits after the November elections this year.

Read about these audits at the PA Dept. of State's link.

<https://www.vote.pa.gov/About-Elections/Pages/Post-Election-Audits.aspx>

Comments to the Board of Elections for the June 5, 2023 meeting

From William Towne

To the Board of Elections:

My comments today raise serious concerns about the administration of elections, including violation of voters' constitutional rights, violations of transparency laws to cover this up and allow it to be repeated, and an official position that elections are decided by other-than-official ballots. You should not certify election results decided by anything other than the will of the voters as expressed on official ballots each counted exactly once.

As a preliminary matter, I note that the Board's website for each meeting claims that written comments will be read or summarized at the meeting. While they used to be inaccurately summarized, and had occasionally been accurately summarized, in recent meetings they have not even been acknowledged at all. The Board also frequently requests (and receives false assurances of) written responses to comments but does not follow up to see that this happens; it does not happen as requested or described. Please do each of these instead of lying to the public by claiming otherwise.

Each section on the following few pages requests specific action(s) from the Board. Because the Board has repeatedly declined requests (which I hereby repeat again here) to schedule regular monthly meetings, it appears likely that this will be the last meeting of the Board which can affect procedures for sending out postal ballots in the 2023 general election.

The Constitution and law

The Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees "secrecy in voting" (Article VII, Section 4).

25 P.S. § 3150.17(a) (titled "Public Records"), which is part of the PA Election Code, states:

(a) General rule.-- All official mail-in ballots, files, applications for ballots and envelopes on which the executed declarations appear and all information and lists are designated and declared to be public records and shall be safely kept for a period of two years, except that no proof of identification shall be made public, nor shall information concerning a military elector be made public which is expressly forbidden by the Department of Defense because of military security.

(b) Record.-- For each election, the county board shall maintain a record of the following information, if applicable, for each elector who makes application for a mail-in ballot:

- (1) The elector's name and voter registration address.
- (2) The date on which the elector's application is received by the county board.
- (3) The date on which the elector's application is approved or rejected by the county board.
- (4) The date on which the county board mails or delivers the mail-in ballot to the elector.
- (5) The date on which the elector's completed mail-in ballot is received by the county board.

(c) Compilation.-- The county board shall compile the records listed under subsection (b) and make the records publicly available upon request within 48 hours of the request.

25 P.S. § 3146.9(a) states the same thing, substituting "absentee" for "mail-in." Here, I use "postal ballots" to concisely cover both.

Require compliance with the Constitution

In some elections, the County violates postal voters' constitutional rights to secrecy¹ by putting a voter-identifying unique code on each ballot, as used to be commonplace before the 1901 constitutional amendment changing away from that. The Board should pass a resolution prohibiting this effective for **all future elections**, requiring that ballots given to any two voters in the same precinct, precinct split if applicable, party in a primary, and voting method² should be completely identical in every way. No voter-specific or voter-identifying markings shall be added to ballots by anyone working for or on behalf of the County or its officials at any time.

This resolution should be passed regardless of what claims or assurances of voluntary compliance you might receive from the Division regarding this next election, because of how often the Division has lied in response to direct questions from the Board. It is distressing to see the Board repeatedly refuse to pass such a motion even when its failure to do so leads to violation of voters' constitutional right to ballot privacy (Article 7 § 4) and violations of the Election Code, for examples 25 P. S. § 2963(g) ("ballots shall vary in form only as the names of districts, offices, candidates or the provisions of this act may require."), 25 P. S. § 2964 ("All ballots for use in the same election district at any primary or election shall be alike."), or 25 P. S. § 3063(a) ("No ballot which is so marked as to be capable of identification shall be counted.") The Board retains responsibility for ensuring the law and Constitution are followed.

Additionally, privacy envelopes (with the hash markings inside, commonly used in personal and business correspondence) should be used for ballot secrecy envelopes instead of the see-through envelopes the County insists on using now. The Board previously asked the County to do this but did not pass any requiring resolution, so the Board and public didn't get anything more than vague false promises. The County should also have and follow written procedures requiring ballot-containing "secrecy" envelopes to be mixed up in large batches before being opened, after they have been removed from declaration envelopes and inspected for any voter-specific markings.

Avoid the appearance of an issue

In this election, postal ballots bore similar codes which were more than long and unique enough to uniquely identify voters, with no explanation. Even if these codes were identical for all ballots sharing the attributes noted above, individual voters could not figure this out from inspection, and even if it were explained it would be priming voters to accept codes that in other elections violate their constitutional rights. The Board should pass a resolution prohibiting the use of these codes or markings on ballots, and require that vendors use quality control measures based on the human-readable text on the ballot identifying the ballot style. General acceptance of election results, which is essential to peaceful transition of power and preservation of our democracy, can require not only getting things right in elections administration but demonstrating to the public in an understandable way that things are being done right. Even with these codes, whatever quality control measures actually being used are not sufficient to prevent sending plenty of voters the wrong ballots, and that should also be fixed.

¹ For County officials making this claim, see e.g., Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas case SA-21-000515 (see Document 4 PDF p. 25, 27, & 60 ¶ 3; Document 1 PDF p. 20 ¶ 109-112; Document 9 PDF p. 12 ¶ 90-92).

² mail-in vs. absentee vs. in person regular vs. in-person with ballot-marking device, possibly vs. in-person provisional regular vs. in-person provisional with ballot-marking device.

Make postal ballots official before certifying election results set by non-official ballots

According to appeals filed by the County in Court of Common Pleas cases SA-22-{342, 343, & 612}, **none** of the mail-in or absentee ballots counted in past elections constitute official ballots – only sample ballots or unvoted ballots as of the time they are mailed out to voters constitute official ballots. Once an eligible voter has voted and returned the ballot (marked “Official Mail-in Ballot” or “Official Absentee Ballot,” in an envelope labeled “Official Election Ballot”) in accordance with instructions, the County claims these ballots cease to be official ballots, but they are still counted toward the totals you are asked to certify. The County’s categorization of all counted postal ballots as not official ballots is openly an attempt to evade the first phrase in the above-cited transparency law, but **only official ballots should be counted in the certified vote totals**. It would be very easy for those who are unsatisfied with election outcomes to point to this counting of hundreds of thousands of ballots which are NOT official ballots, which are enough to flip some races in favor of the declared winner, as a basis for justifying violent responses. The Jan. 6, 2021 Capitol riot shows just the beginning of what is possible when enough people have even much less of an official source than the County’s own court filings and testimony to support their conclusion about a large number of other-than-official ballots being counted against them.

Fortunately, there is an easy way to fix this issue, with a resolution passed by the Board of Elections, as the only citizen oversight of elections theoretically accountable to voters. You can override the Election Division’s determination by passing a resolution at this meeting (a) declaring that all mail-in and absentee ballots included in the vote totals to be certified are official ballots, and (b) ordering withdrawal of the appeals to the contrary in the above-cited cases (and any others in which the County may be taking a similar position). This would also better serve citizens financially than spending a lot of money fighting to hold this position in court and ultimately losing.

The Board can and should do this prior to the certification of these election results, OR not certify election results which have been determined by votes tabulated from ballots that **the Elections Division claims are not official ballots**. The latter would disenfranchise hundreds of thousands of voters who followed County instructions in good faith, so I think the strategy of passing a motion overriding the Division and declaring those to be official ballots is a better way of resolving the discrepancy.

Require quality, documented, observable procedures for remaking ballots

At last November’s election, the direction of the screens used to remake ballots (e.g. from military/civilian overseas write-in ballots onto other official ballots) was helpfully changed, but it was still too far away from observers to be able to see if the remaking was being completed accurately. Further, there are no documented procedures that observers could check practice against. Such procedures should be documented, published, followed, and subject to improvements, such as being able to have multiple people with opposing interests at least observe the full details of the process instead of just having sole County employees working by themselves inventing *ad hoc* procedures each election. The Board should pass a resolution requiring the development and use of written procedures for remaking ballots.

Require each valid official ballot to be counted exactly once

It was disappointing to learn, through the strong evidence discussed by other public commenters at the last meeting (which I independently verified from certified County records), that the County double-

counts at least hundreds of ballots in a specific election, and may omit counting of other batches altogether. Whatever undocumented *ad hoc* process controls the County may have are clearly insufficient to prevent this. The Board should pass a resolution requiring the development and use of written and publicly observable procedures and process controls which lead all valid official ballots – and only those – to be counted exactly once. The Board should also not certify election results in which ballots are double-counted, and should require evidence better than vague false assurances from the Division before certifying that these results are not affected.

Require transparency

The Elections Division holds that the provisions of law quoted at the start of these comments do not apply to the County. For example, it holds that part (c) requiring production of records within 48 hours of a request does not actually require production within a year of the request, even when a lawsuit is filed seeking to require production within months. It holds that it is not required to compile the information as listed in part (b) but that if an elector wants to compile this information from original paper records that also reveal proof of identification information part (a) says should be nonpublic, they can partially do so in a far-too-short appointment at the warehouse. Even when citizens get an order from the PA Office of Open Records requiring disclosure of records described in part (a), the County sues the citizens to block access to public records and claims in Court that text in this section should have no meaning. Some of this original text comes from the leadership of the Allegheny County Elections Division (/prior equivalent) decades ago! The General Assembly passed these laws so that citizens could verify certain aspects of elections administration and be able to either find or verify the absence of other issues raised herein (e.g. double-counting of ballots). The Board is supposed to act as oversight representing these interests of the public expressed in law. Please pass a resolution requiring that the County fully comply with these laws as written and drop its in-court opposition to compliance. This opposition exposes the Board of Elections itself to a potentially very large amount of financial liability in the form of penalties and legal fees, and the costs of fighting transparency, especially to cover up actual issues in elections administration, are not a good use of taxpayer resources.

Ensure backup for ePollbooks

The County noted at election worker trainings last year that electronic pollbooks are planned for this year, though there has been little to no discussion of this in a way that would allow for public awareness and input into system selection or the design of surrounding procedures so as to satisfy legitimate concerns. Collective experience from other jurisdictions shows that these systems sometimes go down, which can severely reduce trust in elections administration. The County should maintain a backup paper-based option and adequately train pollworkers on when and how to use that backup, in addition to the primary system, even if this requires increasing the length of pollworker training. The apparent lack of plans for a backup is especially concerning given the elimination of any faster-queue option for judges of election to call the Elections Division for resolution of election day problems, leading to more bounces from full call queues and long hold times mixed in with what other members of the public experience when trying to reach the Elections Division by phone on election day.

Follow-up and conclusion

If the Board or any individual members would like additional detail or discussion on any of the points raised above, I welcome a follow-up conversation before, during, or after the Board meeting at your convenience. Thank you for your time and attention to these matters.